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Abstract—Distributed learning such as federated learning or
collaborative learning enables model training on decentralized
data from users and only collects local gradients, where data
is processed close to its sources for data privacy. The nature
of not centralizing the training data addresses the privacy issue
of privacy-sensitive data. Recent studies show that a third party
can reconstruct the true training data in the distributed machine
learning system through the publicly-shared gradients. However,
existing reconstruction attack frameworks lack generalizability
on different Deep Neural Network (DNN) architectures and
different weight distribution initialization, and can only succeed
in the early training phase. To address these limitations, in
this paper, we propose a more general privacy attack from
gradient, SAPAG, which uses a Gaussian kernel based of gradient
difference as a distance measure. Our experiments demonstrate
that SAPAG can construct the training data on different DNNs
with different weight initializations and on DNNs in any training
phases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed learning such as federated learning or collab-
orative learning [1]–[4] refers to a setting where learning is
done by multiple processors that are distributed (in space).
It enables the devices at geographically different locations to
collaboratively learn a machine learning model without sharing
the local training data.
On the one hand, the nature of not centralizing the training
data on one server can help fast training on large-scale
datasets. On the other hand, it addresses the privacy issue
of privacy-sensitive data, such as personal health data [5],
genomic data, and confidential data in commercial entities.
Federated learning works in a way that each local device
can access the model parameters and train the model on the
local training data, then only share the gradients back with the
server. The server updates the shared model using the averages
of gradients sent by multiple devices.
It is usually assumed that distributed learning is privacy
guaranteed since the shared gradients contain no sufficient
information to recover the original training data. However,
several recent studies have made people rethink the privacy
issue of distributed learning and federated learning by showing
that it is possible to recover the training data just using the
gradients. Researches such as [6]–[8] show that the training
data can be inferred from the gradients. The DLG algorithm
proposed by [9] extends the reconstruction of images to pixel-
pixel accuracy by matching the gradients of a dummy image
to the gradients of the attack target. However, existing works
have at least one of the following limitations: (i) lack of
generalizability on different Deep Neural Network (DNN)
architectures; (ii) lack of generalizability on different weight
distribution initialization; (iii) they only succeeded in the early
training phase.
To address these issues, we provide a more general pri-
vacy attack from gradients in this work: it can successfully
reconstruct the training data on networks of any weights
initialization or during training stage. The proposed method
uses a Gaussian kernel of gradients differences as a basic
measure of gradients distances, and the scaling factor in the
Gaussian kernel is adaptive to the unique distribution of the
gradients of the attack target. Our contributions are:
• (Self-adaptive Attack) We develop a self-adaptive pri-
vacy attack from gradients algorithm (SAPAG) to recon-
struct private training data from gradients in distributed
learning systems. By self-learning the distribution of gra-
dients, SAPAG can adapt to different weight distributions
of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs).
• (Environment Generality) SAPAG is a reconstruction
attack framework that is compatible with various DNNs
architectures (e.g. ResNet [10], Transformer [11]) with
any kinds of weight distributions.
• (Effectiveness) Our algorithm SAPAG can reconstruct
the training data in any training phases of the DNN
model.
Evaluations on different datasets and different DNNs show
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Fig. 1: Privacy leakage from the gradient process.
that SAPAG can reconstruct the training data on DNNs with
different weight initializations and on DNNs in different train-
ing stages. In addition, SAPAG has higher reconstruction ac-
curacy and faster convergence speed than the existing method,
such as DLG. We also apply our attack on a transformer-based
language model, on which it can also recover the token-wise
training text. Studying the attack mechanism is beneficial to
guide the designing of secure training schemes. Our attack
can provide valuable information to the defense strategies in
distributed learning.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Distributed learning
With the increasing size of training data and growing
concerns on data privacy, training machine learning models
efficiently and preserving training data privacy become chal-
lenging. Distributed learning (especially federated learning)
has been developed to overcome this challenge [12], [13].
Instead of uploading all the data to a centralized server and
training it jointly, distributed learning enables training on a
large corpus of decentralized data on edge devices and only
collects the local models or gradients for global synchroniza-
tion on a central server [14]–[16].
B. Privacy leakage from gradients
Privacy leakage is studied in the training phase and predic-
tion phase. Privacy attack from gradient and model inversion
(MI) attack [6] aims at the training phase by constructing the
features of the training data by using the correlation between
the training data and the model output. [6] showed that it
is possible to infer individual genomic data via access to a
linear model for personalized medicine. Recent works extend
MI attack to recover features of training data of DNN models.
Privacy attack from gradients is different from previous MI at-
tack. It reconstructs the training data exploiting their gradients
in a machine learning model. The process of privacy leakage
from gradients is shown at Figure 1. Although distributed
learning system protects privacy by not sharing training data,
research works have shown that it is possible to infer the
information of training data from the shared gradients in both
language tasks and computer vision tasks. [8] enables the
identification of words used in the training tokens by analyzing
the gradients of the embedding layer. [17] proposes an attack
algorithm to synthesize images mimicking the real training
images by Generative Adversary Network (GAN) models.
Besides the works that recover certain properties of the training
data, a more recent work DLG [9] shows that it is possible to
recover training data with pixel-wise accuracy for images and
token-wise matching for texts by gradient matching. It first
randomly generates a dummy image and a dummy label and
then calculates the gradients according to the current weights
of the network, and the dummy image and dummy label are
updated by minimizing the Euclidean distance of gradients
from the dummy image and the real training data.
DLG achieves the reconstruction of images from differ-
ent datasets on LeNet-5. However, DLG has limitations on
evaluating the performance thoroughly on different weight
initialization settings, various networks, and different training
stages (pretrained versus initialized). From our experiments,
we have inferred that the DLG method is sensitive to the
weight distribution of DNN and can only recover images under
the uniform weight initialization, but cannot recover images
under a normal weight initialization (as shown in Figure 2) or
for pretrained DNN models.
Ground TruthDLG DLG
Uniform Weight
Initialization
Normal Weight
Initialization
Fig. 2: DLG’s reconstructions of an image from CIFAR-100
for LeNet-5 with uniform and normal weight initialization
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We assume that an adversary cannot access the private data
(X,Y) in local training directly, but it is able to gain the
gradients that the local devices shared and the current global
model F(W,X).
The objective of the attack is to reconstruct the training data
using the shared gradients. The reconstruction is pixel-pixel
reconstruction for image data and token-token reconstruction
for text data. Moreover, the attack needs to be robust for any
weight initialization and any training stage of the shared global
model. More formally, the problem can be formulated as:
Constructing (X′,Y′)
s.t.
∂L(F(W,X′);Y′)
∂W
=
∂L(F(W,X);Y)
∂W
(1)
where (X′,Y′) are the reconstructed training data, i.e. images
and labels for image tasks, and tokens and labels for language
tasks, L(F(W,X′);Y′) is the loss for model F(W,X).
IV. METHOD AND ANALYSIS
Now, we provide details on our SAPAG algorithm.
A. Dummy data and dummy gradients
In order to reconstruct the training data, we first initialize
the reconstructed training data as (X′,Y′). We call X′ as
the dummy input. Y′ is the dummy label. We can get the
corresponding dummy gradient as
∇W′ = ∂L(F(W,X
′);Y′)
∂W
(2)
B. Distance between the dummy gradient and the ground truth
gradient
The next step in SAPAG is to optimize ∇W′ and bring it
closer to the ground truth gradient ∇W as much as possible.
In this case, we need to define a differentiable distance
function D(W,W′), so that we can obtain the best X′ and
Y′ as follows:
(X∗,Y∗) = arg min
(X′,Y′)
D(∇W′,∇W) (3)
C. Distance function for gradient matching
We have observed empirically that in the weight initializa-
tion stage, the ground truth gradients∇W of the same training
data are smaller when initializing the weights of the neural
networks by a normal distribution than by a uniform distribu-
tion. Besides, the ∇W under a normal weight initialization
gathers around zero values more heavily than the ∇W under
a uniform weight initialization. When we obtain the dummy
gradient∇W′ from the dummy data, we have noted that∇W′
values are much smaller than the ∇W values under the same
setting. If we use the Euclidean distance between ∇W′ and
∇W as the distance function, the reconstruction of the training
data is driven by large gradients at the early stages. However,
this might cause a problem under a normal weight initialization
since most of the gradients gather around zero while a small
proportion of gradients have large values.
To overcome this problem, instead of using the Euclidean
distance between ∇W′ and ∇W as the distance function, we
use a weighted Gaussian kernel based function as our distance
function:
D(∇W′,∇W) = Q · (1− exp(−‖∇W
′ −∇W‖2
σ2
)) (4)
where Q is a factor specified for each layer’s ∇W and its
value decreases along with the order of the layer. By doing
this, we put larger weights on the gradient differences on
the front layers as they are closer to the input training data.
σ2(∇W) is the scaling factor associated with ∇W. The value
of σ2 is crucial and needs to be suitable for different weight
settings. We have found that the gradient ∇W roughly follows
a Gaussian distribution with very long tails and centres at 0.
We can use the variance of ∇W to estimate the optimal σ2:
σ2 = Var(∇W) (5)
Thus, it is adaptive to the attack target.
Next, we will introduce the properties of our distance
function in comparison with the Euclidean function of ∇W
and ∇W′. The first derivative of the loss in Eq. 4 with respect
to ∇W′ can be written as:
∂D
∂∇W′ = 2Q·
(∇W′ −∇W)
σ2
exp(
−‖∇W′ −∇W‖2
σ2
) (6)
The second derivative of the loss in Eq. 4 with respect to
∇W′ can be written as:
∂2D
∂∇W′2 =4Q ·
(∇W′ −∇W)2 − σ2
σ4
· exp(−‖∇W
′ −∇W‖2
σ2
)
(7)
We can infer from Eq. 7 that the max value of ∂D∂∇W′ in
Eq. 6 is 2Q/(eσ) when (∇W′ −∇W)2 = σ2. The absolute
magnitude of the derivative ∂D∂∇W′ in Equation 6 first increases
and then decreases along with an increase in the gradient
difference between ∇W′ and ∇W.
The first derivative of the Euclidean distance ∇W′ and
∇W with respect to ∇W′ is:
∂D
∂∇W′ = 2(∇W
′ −∇W) (8)
∂D
∂∇W′ is in proportion with the magnitude of the gradient
difference. Equation 6 can be viewed as a weighted sum
of gradient differences comparing to equation 8. The non-
linearity of ∂D∂∇W′ in Equation 6 can make it less affected by
large gradients. The reconstruction process at an early stage for
a normal weight initialization will be driven by the majority
of the gradients instead of a small proportion of the large
gradients.
D. SAPAG algorithm
Our complete SAPAG algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1,
and the highlights of our SAPAG algorithm are as follows.
We initialize a dummy data (X′,Y′) and obtain the gradient
∇W′ of the dummy data. We update the dummy data in each
iteration to minimize the distance between the dummy gradient
∇W′ and the real data gradient ∇W. In contrast to [9], we
use a weighted Gaussian kernel based function in Eq.4 as our
distance function, and the initialization of the dummy data can
be generated from a normal distribution or constant values C
as shown in Algorithm 1. At each step after updating (X′,Y′)
in line 5, we normalize the value of (X′,Y′) to a certain range
in line 6 to prevent it from being trapped at some extreme value
and make the training more stable.
Algorithm 1 The Process of SAPAG
1: Initial: X′ ∼ N (0, 1) or C, Y′ ∼ N (0, 1)
2: for i in Iterations do
3: Get gradient ∇W′ ← ∂L(f(X,W)/∂W′)
4: D(∇W′,∇Wi)← Q · (1− exp(−‖∇W
′−∇Wi‖2
σ2 ))
5: Update (X′,Y′):
6: X′ ← X′ − η ∂D(∇W
′,∇W〉)
∂∇X′ ,
7: Y′ ← Y′ − η ∂D(∇W
′,∇W〉)
∂∇Y′
8: Normalize X′ ∈ [0, 1]
9: end for
E. Evaluation Metrics
In order to evaluate the attack efficiency and the recon-
struction quality, we use three different metrics to measure
the difference/similarity between reconstructed training data
and the real training data, namely Mean Square Error (MSE),
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), and Structural Similarity
Index Measure (SSIM).
MSE measures the difference between recovered data X′
and the training data X and is calculated as:
MSE(X′,X) =
M∑
i=1
1
M
(X′i −Xi)2 (9)
Where Xi and X′i are the ith pixel value in X and X
′, M is
the total number of pixels.
PSNR is calculated as:
PSNR(X′,X) = 20·log10(MAX)−10·log10(MSE) (10)
where MAX is the maximum possible pixel value of the
image.
SSIM [18] is a weighted combination of three comparison
measures: luminance, contrast, and structure. When all the
weights are 1, SSIM can be derived as:
SSIM(X′,X) =
(2µX′µX + c1)(2σX′X + c2)
(µ2X′ + µ
2
X + c1)(σ
2
X′ + σ
2
X + c2)
(11)
where µX′ is the mean of X′, µX is the mean of X, σX′
is the variance of X′, σX is the variance of X, σXX′ is the
covariance of X′ and X. c1 = (k1L)2 and c2 = (k2L)2.
L is the dynamic range of the pixel-values, k1 = 0.01 and
k2 = 0.03, by default.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
All of our experiments are conducted on the AWS EC2
cloud instance with Intel(R) Xeon(R) Platinum 8175M (96
virtual CPUs with 748 GB memory) and 8 NVIDIA Tesla
V100 GPUs (32 GB memory) and another server with Intel(R)
Xeon(R) Gold 5218 (64 virtual CPUs with 504 GB memory)
and 8 NVIDIA Quadro RTX 6000 GPUs (24GB memory) by
PyTorch 1.5.1, Python 3.6, and CUDA 10.2.
MNIST CIFAR-100 LFW
DLG SAPAG DLG SAPAG DLG SAPAG
MSE 1.39e-7 1.50e-8 4.21e-5 2.57e-5 4.27e-5 2.12e-6
PSNR 68.61 78.23 43.91 55.91 43.76 56.74
SSIM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(a) LeNet-5: Uniform Weight Initialization
MNIST CIFAR-100 LFW
DLG SAPAG DLG SAPAG DLG SAPAG
MSE 1.10 2.77e-5 0.64 5.76e-4 1.27 8.4e-4
PSNR -0.41 45.60 3.75 32.43 -1.04 30.72
SSIM 3.20e-3 0.99 7.90e-2 0.98 7.55e-3 0.98
(b) LeNet-5: Normal Weight Initialization
TABLE I: A comparison of the reconstruction quality of
MNIST, CIFAR-100 and LFW for LeNet-5 between the DLG
and the proposed method.
VI. EVALUATION ON COMPUTER VISION TASKS
A. Datasets and Networks
To make a general evaluation, we use different image
datasets including MNIST [19], CIFAR-100 [20], LFW [21]
and ImageNet [22]. MNIST, CIFAR-100, LFW, and ImageNet
(a) LeNet-5: Uniform Weight Initialization
(b) LeNet-5: Normal Weight Initialization
DLGIters = 0 Iters = 50 Iters = 500 Ground Truth
CIFAR-100
CIFAR-100
MNIST
MNIST
LFW
LFW
DLGIters = 0 Iters = 50 Iters = 500 Ground Truth
SAPAG
SAPAG
Fig. 3: Reconstruction of images from MNIST, LFW and
CIFAR-100 datasets for LeNet-5 with weights initialized by
uniform and normal distributions. The DLG algorithm can
only recover the training images under uniform weight initial-
ization, while SAPAG can recover the training images under
both uniform and normal weight initializations of LeNet-5.
have 10, 100, 5,749, and 1,000 classes, respectively. We
also consider different DNNs with different levels of depth,
including LeNet-5 and ResNet-18. LeNet-5 consists of 4
convolutional layers and one fully connected layer and uses
Sigmoid as the activation function. The kernel size, the number
of output channels, and the strides for each convolutional
layer are 5, 12, and 1, respectively. ResNet-18 consists of 17
convolutional layers and one fully connected layer and uses
Sigmoid as the activation function. The kernel size of each
convolutional layer is 3. The number of output channels for the
first convolutional layer is 64. The numbers of output channels
for the following four blocks are 64, 128, 256, and 512. The
stride for all the convolutional layers is 1.
B. Results for Untrained Networks
To evaluate the performance of SAPAG, we first apply it
to untrained networks with a uniform weight initialization
and Xavier normal weight initialization [23]. The range of
the uniform distribution is (-0.5, 0.5), and the gain factor of
the Xavier normal distribution is 1. The optimizer used in
experiments on LeNet-5 is L-BFGS [24] for both and the
optimizer used in experiments on ResNet-18 is AdamW [25].
The learning rate we have used is 1 for the L-BFGS optimizer
CIFAR-100 LFW ImageNet
DLG Adam DLG SAPAG DLG Adam DLG SAPAG DLG Adam DLG SAPAG
MSE 510.91 0.14 0.03 347.79 0.18 0.06 1535.97 0.18 0.04
PSNR -27.08 8.46 15.16 -25.41 7.27 12.27 -31.84 7.49 14.48
SSIM 1.63e-3 0.72 0.86 1.69e-3 0.67 0.83 7.86e-4 0.65 0.93
(a) ResNet-18: Uniform Weight Initialization
CIFAR-100 LFW ImageNet
DLG Adam DLG SAPAG DLG Adam DLG SAPAG DLG Adam DLG SAPAG
MSE 1.16 0.12 0.01 1.31 0.27 0.04 8126.61 0.28 0.05
PSNR -0.66 9.37 19.02 -1.13 5.63 14.04 -36.60 5.47 12.90
SSIM 1.22e-2 0.76 0.95 5.12e-3 0.64 0.87 1.79e-4 0.56 0.89
(b) ResNet-18: Normal Weight Initialization
TABLE II: A comparison of the reconstruction quality of CIFAR-100, LFW, and ImageNet for ResNet-18 between the DLG
and the proposed method.
(a) ResNet-18: Uniform Weight Initialization
(b) ResNet-18: Normal Weight Initialization
CIFAR-100
CIFAR-100
LFW
LFW
ImageNet
Iters = 0 Iters = 6,000 Iters = 20,000 DLG Adam_DLG Ground Truth
ImageNet
Iters = 0 Iters = 6,000 Iters = 20,000 DLG Adam_DLG Ground Truth
SAPAG
SAPAG
Fig. 4: Reconstruction of images from LFW, CIFAR-100,
and ImageNet datasets for ResNet18 with weights initialized
by uniform and normal distributions. The optimizer used is
L-BFGS for DLG and AdamW for the proposed method
and Adam DLG. The proposed method achieves the best
reconstruction quality under both uniform and normal weight
initializations of ResNet-18.
and 0.001 for the AdamW optimizer. The maximum number of
iterations is set as 500 for the L-BFGS optimizer and 20,000
for the AdamW optimizer.
The reconstruction quality of MNIST, LFW, and CIFAR-
100, on LeNet-5, are shown in Table I and LFW, CIFAR-100,
and ImageNet on ResNet-18 are shown in Table II. The results
indicate that the proposed attack method generally performs
better than the DLG method in terms of reconstruction quality
measures MSE, PSNR, and SSIM. Both our method and DLG
have the best reconstruction quality on MNIST dataset, which
is intuitive since MNIST dataset has less complicated patterns
Iterations
Lo
g(
M
SE
)
DLG
SAPAG
iters = 50
iters = 50
iters = 100
iters = 100
iters = 250
Fig. 5: The plot of MSE in logarithmic scale along with
iterations for DLG and SAPAG.
(a) Trained LeNet-5: an 
example from training set
Iters = 
0
Iters = 
500
Iters = 
1,000
(b) Trained LeNet-5: an 
example from validation set
Epoch 1 
Iters = 
0
Iters = 
500
Iters = 
1,000
Epoch 5
Epoch 10
20 epoch: 30% accu
20 epoch: 36% accu
Epoch 20
Epoch 100
Fig. 6: Reconstruction of images from the training set and
validation set for LeNet-5 trained for 1, 5, and 10 epochs.
than CIFAR-100 and LFW. Figure 3 and 4 show examples
from different datasets comparing with DLG and the ground
truth. For LeNet-5, our method can recover the major shape
of an image after only 50 iterations and converge after 500
iterations using the L-BFGS optimizer. And for ReNset-18,
our method can recover the major shape of an image after
only 6,000 iterations and converge after 20,000 iterations for
the AdamW optimizer. Figure 5 compares the convergence
speed of SAPAG and DLG for reconstructing an image from
CIFAR-100 for LeNet-5. It shows that SAPAG has a faster
Initiali-
zation
Final
Ground 
Truth
Middle 
Stage
Early 
Stage
Fig. 7: SAPAG reconstruction of a batch of 8 images from
CIFAR-100 dataset for ResNet-18 with weights initialized by
a normal distribution.
convergence speed and converges at a smaller MSE than DLG.
1) The impact of weight initialization: A comparison of
the reconstruction quality between uniform and normal weight
initializations in Table I and II show that our method has a
slightly better reconstruction for uniform weight initialization
than normal weight initialization on LeNet-5, while reverse
is true on ResNet-18. Nevertheless, our method can have a
reasonably good reconstruction on both weight initialization
settings. However, we have found that DLG can only recover
images under a uniform weight initialization on LeNet-5 using
the L-BFGS optimizer and ResNet-18 using the AdamW
optimizer.
2) The impact of dummy image initialization: We have
realized that the initialization of dummy images is also crucial
to the reconstruction of the training data. We have employed
two different initialization strategies: random initialization and
constant initialization. For some attack targets, the random
initialization of dummy image can be faster and yield a
better reconstruction of the training image than the constant
initialization of dummy images, while the reverse is true for
some other attack targets. It depends on the unique pattern of
each attack target.
3) The impact of optimizer: Our experimental results reveal
that the L-BFGS optimizer speeds up convergence when
optimizing dummy images on LeNet-5 but has the problem
of unstable training. For ResNet-18, the L-BFGS optimizer
usually converges at a point where the loss is not small
enough and the training image is not well recovered. However,
optimizer AdamW is more stable and can achieve much
smaller loss upon convergence. A comparison of L2 norm loss
using the L-BFGS and AdamW optimizers in Table II shows
that AdamW optimizer has a much smaller MSE and a higher
PSNR and SSIM than the L-BFGS optimizer.
4) The impact of network depth: LeNet-5 has 5 layers in
total and ResNet-18 has 18 layers in total and 183 times more
trainable parameters than LeNet-5. The reconstruction quality
of CIFAR-100 and LFW datasets on ResNet-18 is lower than
that on LeNet-5 in terms of all the three evaluation metrics.
However, as a deeper network, ResNet-18 is not able to protect
privacy either. The decrease of PSNR or SSIM mainly comes
from noise in the background and luminance differences of
images. As shown in Figure 4, the main structure of images
is leaked.
C. Results for Trained Networks
Hypothetically, the attack can happen at any time during the
local training process. Except for weight initialization, we also
evaluate SAPAG on networks trained for different numbers
of epochs. We aim to explore how the change in weight
distribution can affect the attack effectiveness. The experiment
is applied on CIFAR-100 dataset and on LeNet-5 network.
The optimizer used is L-BFGS, the learning rate is 1, and the
maximum number of iterations is 500. To study the impact on
training data and validation data, we attack images from both
training data and validation data on LeNet-5 networks trained
for 1, 5, and 10 epochs.
Figure 6 shows the reconstruction of an example from
the training set and validation set of CIFAR-100 on trained
LeNet-5 network. In the early stages of the training process
of LeNet-5 (epoch = 1), the attack can recover the training
image and validation image with very few noises. After 10
epochs, the noises in the reconstructed images increases, but
the objects in the images are recognizable. When the training
epoch of LeNet-5 reaches 100, the reconstructed images are
still recognizable. We found that the construction quality of the
training images (used to train the model) and validation images
(not used to train the model) has no significant difference. We
found empirically that the training of networks would cause
the gradients of the training data decreases, thus the gradients
carries less information. The scaling factor in the Gaussian
kernel in SAPAG is adaptive to the gradient distribution of
the attack target. Therefore, SAPAG is able to reconstruct the
training image even when its gradients become very small.
D. Results for Batched Training Data
Now we have demonstrated that the proposed attack works
well on one single image under different network settings. In
the practice of distributed training, the gradients shared come
from a batch of training data instead of one single training
data. Except for evaluating our work on a single pair of input
and labels, we also evaluate our proposed attack method on
the data where the batch size is larger than 1. We randomly
sample a batch of 8 images from CIFAR-100 and get their
gradients from ResNet-18 with weight initialized by a normal
distribution. The architecture of ResNet-18 is the same as
above. We then randomly initialize 8 dummy images and stack
them together and get their gradients similarly. The optimizer
used is AdamW and the learning rate is set as 0.001.
Figure 7 shows the results of recovering a random batch
of training data including 8 images. At the early stage of
reconstruction, the main color of each image was first recov-
ered for images 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. In the middle stages of
reconstruction, the shape of each image was then recovered.
Finally, the recovered batch images are very similar to the
ground truth in terms of both color and shape but in a different
Example 1 Example 2
SAPAG
nonstudent advisor or or collaborators
collaborators should appropriately as appropriately
coauthors or or be. however
students are requested to honor
the submitting spirit student by by
submitting references of for
DLG
nonstudent investigators advisors as,
collaborators should collaborators primary will
September will will session work
students to students been the the
collaborators the conference the accepted the
submitting no the September will will session work
Ground Truth
nonstudent advisor or collaborators
should be acknowledged appropriately,
as coauthors or otherwise. however
students are requested to honor
the spirit of the program by
submitting only work for
TABLE III: Examples of privacy attack from gradients on language model.
order, except that the wale in the fifth image was cut into
halves in the recovered image.
We found that the reconstruction of batch training data
does not require additional training time. The reconstruction
process for the 8 images converges after 20,000 iterations
using AdamW optimizer. The reconstruction speed is similar
to that for one single image. Besides, the reconstruction quality
does not decrease for the batch training data.
VII. EVALUATION ON NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING
TASKS
The data we use are some random texts from the website
page. The Network consists of one position encoder, two
transformer encoders, and one transformer decoder [11]. The
number of heads in the self-attention layer is 4 and The
dimension of the feed-forward network model is 200. The
activation function is Gaussian Error Linear Units (GELU)
[26].
We embed the text tokens into an embedding space of
5,000 dimensions and feed the embedding to the Transformer
model. The embedding weights are uniformly initialized. The
dummy data is a randomly initialized dummy embedding. The
optimizer we used in the attack method is AdamW and the
maximum number of iterations is set as 20,000. When we
obtain the reconstructed embedding from SAPAG, tokens can
be recovered as the multiplication of reconstructed embedding
matrix and MoorePenrose pseudoinverse matrix [27] of the
weights matrix. Finally, we get the reconstructed sentence
from the tokens via vocabulary. Table III compares the recon-
struction of two sentences including 15 words from website
page for SAPAG and DLG. The words that match the ground
truth text are highlighted in bold. SAPAG is able to recover
most key words in the ground truth text, while DLG catches
fewer words in the ground truth text. In addition, the results
of SAPAG are closer to continuous and meaningful sentences.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provide a privacy attack from gradients:
SAPAG. We demonstrate that SAPAG can successfully re-
construct the training data for different DNNs with different
weight initializations and for DNNs in any training phases. Our
experiments show that SAPAG has a faster convergence speed
and higher reconstruction accuracy than the DLG algorithm.
The experiments on a transformer-based language model show
that SAPAG can successfully reconstruct token-wise training
text. We found that L-BFGS optimizer works well when
recovering the training data for LeNet-5 but it is not stable
on ResNet-18. AdamW optimizer is more stable and has a
better performance on ResNet-18. For the same training data,
SAPAG has lower reconstruction accuracies from gradients on
a deeper neural network (ResNet-18) than on a shallow neural
network (LeNet-5), but the reconstruction is still efficient for
ResNet-18. We believe that our work provides an important
guide towards secure distributed learning.
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